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Recent technology change and market liberalization have substantially reduced the costs
of providing international message telephone services (IMTS). However, the full extent
of these cost reductions have generally not been reflected in lower prices. This paper
reviews the recent literature on international telecommunications markets, and examines
regulation and IMTS pricing behaviour. Particular attention is given to the accounting
rate system (ARS), uniform settlement policies, and asymmetric competition. Several
market behaviour scenarios are described where regulation has resulted in carriers
implementing inefficient pricing rules for both accounting and collection rates. Finally,
economic and political strategies are put forward that could supplant the current
outmoded and uneconomic ARS, and bring about the full benefits of a freely functioning
marketplace to telecommunications users.
1. Introduction
Recent technology change and market liberalisation have substantially
reduced the costs of providing international message telephone services
(IMTS). The full extent of these cost reductions have generally not been
reflected in lower prices that match the falling cost of service provision. For
example, whilst the per minute cost of using transatlantic cable fell from
US$4.87 in 1956 to US$0.05 in 1996, US consumers presently pay an
average of US$0.85 per-minute for international calls (FCC, 1997a).
Estimates from Einhorn (1997) suggest the actual incremental costs of
these calls are between US$0.06 and 0.09. In Australia, the Productivity
Commission (1997) estimates the average price of an international call is five
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times the long-run marginal cost of providing service. The Commission
argues that regulation, restricting domestic market competition, accounts for
a large proportion of the price–cost margin, and that regulatory reforms from
July 1997 should force prices towards cost. However, evidence from countries
with deregulated international telecommunications sectors suggests that
whilst increased competition may reduce prices, it may not necessarily lead to
economically efficient pricing (Johnson 1991, Stanley 1991, FCC 1997a).
This paper provides a historical review of international telecommunications
markets, and examines regulation and IMTS pricing. The purpose of the
study is to highlight issues relevant to policy formation when considering
telecommunications reform. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2
describes the institutional framework in which international telecommunica-
tions markets are organized. The pricing of IMTS within  the  current
accounting rate system (ARS) is examined in Section 3. Section 4 defines
asymmetric competition in international telephone markets and describes
several strategic behaviour scenarios between facilities-based (FB) carriers.
Section 5 examines economic and political strategies that could supplant the
current outmoded and uneconomic ARS. Concluding remarks are provided in
Section 6.
2. Institutional Framework of International Telecommunications
Markets
International telecommunications has been strictly regulated at the national
and international level since the latter half of the 19th century. In most
countries, statutory regulations created a single publicly owned tele-
communications operator to provide local exchange, long-distance and
international services. Mandated supply was typically justified by natural
monopoly arguments and often tied to an obligation to provide universal
service—commonly interpreted as the promise to supply basic telephony to
customers even when it is not economically viable to do so. This process of
domestic monopolization means that telecommunications carriers cannot
provide international messages over their own facilities from the point of
origin to the point of destination (Ergas and Patterson, 1991; Frieden 1996).
National monopolies have traditionally provided international service by
connecting their domestic networks to international half circuits.1 The
resulting international network comprises of three distinct segments jointly
1 The half circuit concept operates on the presumption that corresponding carriers achieve a ‘whole
circuit’ by linking two half circuits at the theoretical midpoint of a submarine cable, or at the satellite
providing the transmission link (Frieden, 1996).
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operated by the carriers from both countries. The domestic (or tail) segment
transfers the call from the originating handset through the domestic country
local exchange to the international gateway. International interconnection
occurs via the two international half circuits linking the home country
gateway to the foreign country gateway. The call then travels along the
foreign country international gateway through their local exchange to the end
recipient. This final segment is commonly referred to as the foreign tail.
Typically, the facilities used for the two tails are separately owned and
operated by the domestic and foreign carriers. The domestic carrier bears all
costs associated with traffic along the domestic tail while the foreign carrier
bears all costs along the foreign tail. The international whole circuit is
assumed jointly owned by both the domestic and foreign country FB carriers,
who equally share the costs of transmission.2 Thus, the marginal cost of an
outgoing call (cO) from the domestic to the foreign country is:
cO = cd + cint + cf (1)
where cd is the marginal transmission cost for the domestic country tail
(incurred by the domestic carrier), cint is the marginal transmission cost for the
international whole circuit (shared between the domestic and foreign carrier),
and cf is the marginal transmission cost for the foreign country tail (incurred
by the foreign carrier).
Since the retail price (collection rate) charged for an international call is
collected by the originating carrier, a mechanism is needed to allow the
originating carrier to compensate the terminating and transit carriers for any
costs incurred in handling incoming traffic.3 The ARS was developed during
the 1930s and 1940s to facilitate the division of revenues for telephone calls
between origin, destination and transit countries. Under the system, the two
carriers (i.e. domestic and foreign) negotiate a bilateral agreement which
describes the cost-sharing arrangements and technical details of inter-
connection. The domestic and foreign carrier agree upon an accounting rate
(usually denominated in US dollars), which is the internal price between the
carriers for the jointly provided international service (ITU, 1997). The ARS
implicitly regulates market entry as only designated carriers are allowed to
establish operating agreements for the exchange of international telephone
2 For example, international carriers jointly own, operate, and maintain the international satellite
co-operative INTELSAT.
3 Countries without accounting rate agreements or transmission links can complete calls by transiting
the traffic through a third country. In return for providing a through circuit, the transit country is paid a
share of the accounting rate between the originating and terminating countries (typically 40:40:20) (ITU,
1996).
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calls at the agreed accounting rate. Any other party must acquire capacity for
international telephony by paying the collection rate or interconnection tariff
charged by an authorized international carrier (ITU, 1996).
The accounting rate is the basic unit of account from which international
settlements payments are made between the domestic and foreign carrier in
a bilateral market (O’Brien, 1988). The two carriers mutually determine the
accounting rate, and bargain over the division of the accounting rate into
the settlement rate. Division of the accounting rate into distinct outgoing and
incoming settlement rates determines the amount that each country pays for
access to the other country networks. For example, for US outgoing calls to
the UK, the US carrier obtains the collection rate from its domestic customer
and pays the UK carrier the outgoing settlement rate for access to the UK
network. For US incoming calls, the US carrier bears the initial cost of ter-
minating the call and is reimbursed by the UK carrier with the incoming
settlement rate. Accordingly, outgoing (incoming) settlement rates represent
an intermediate cost (revenue) in the production of IMTS, while collection
rates are the final price charged to consumers.4
The ARS was designed for bilateral markets with monopoly partners
providing IMTS. However, unlike most countries, international telegraph and
telex services have traditionally been provided by several carriers in the US.
Asymmetric market entry regulations on US bilateral telex and telegraph
markets therefore ensured an oligopoly (or ‘competitive’) structure at the US
end of the market and a monopoly at the foreign end. Competition at the US
end of the market provided foreign monopoly carriers with an advantage that
is harmful to the US carriers (otherwise known as whipsawing). For example,
the monopoly carrier may promise a larger proportion of its outbound
(telegraph and telex) traffic to a particular US competitive carrier in exchange
for a lower accounting rate, an accounting rate division other than 50:50, or
better technical interconnection arrangements (Kwerel, 1994; Kennedy and
Pastor, 1996). The remaining competitive carriers are forced to match these
concessions, otherwise the monopoly carrier may divert all its return traffic
towards the compliant competitive carrier.
To prevent whipsawing, the FCC implemented a uniform settlement policy
(USP) whereby US carriers providing telegraph, telex and telephony services
had to accept the same settlement arrangements with the foreign monopoly.5
The ‘equal treatment for all carriers’ and ‘50:50 accounting rate division’ rules
4 Settlement payments are made on a net traffic basis. When traffic is balanced, and settlement rates
are the same for incoming and originating calls, then no settlement payments are made between carriers.
5 Precedence was established in the 1936 case, Mackay Radio & Telegraph Company v. FCC 97 F. 2d
641.
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require that all US carriers accept the same accounting rate for a particular
bilateral market, and that the accounting rate is divided equally (so that
settlement rates are the same for terminating incoming calls and originating
outgoing calls). This arrangement removed the incentive for a single
competitive US carrier to accept less favourable conditions as they will apply
to all carriers (Cave, 1995). Further, by forbidding price discrimination, and
requiring a 50:50 accounting rate division, the foreign monopoly is prevented
from creditably threatening to take actions that adversely affect the US carrier
(O’Brien, 1988). While these rules have been successful in preventing the
widespread use of whipsawing, they are criticized for introducing additional
de facto regulations which impede competition and impose a downward
rigidity in accounting and collection rates.6
For USPs to be effective, they must be accompanied by rules directing the
monopoly carrier to return traffic to competing carriers in proportion to
incoming traffic received. Proportionate return regulation has two main aims:
to support the 50:50 rule by reducing the incentive for competitors to secure
additional return traffic through a unilateral reduction in accounting rates;
and to provide an incentive for unilateral collection rate reductions as an
increase in market share will generate a corresponding higher share of
incoming calls. While the motives of proportionate return are sound, the rule
can lead to inefficient pricing when carriers price collection rates below
marginal cost. An outgoing call entitles the carrier to receive a return
proportion of incoming calls, and to make profits from the excess of the
settlement rate over the cost of terminating incoming calls. As collection rates
decline at the competitive end, the number of outgoing calls increase. Such
divergence in collection rates may encourage call reversion (Cave, 1995).
3. The Accounting Rate System and Pricing of
International Services
The 50:50 accounting rate rule has important implications for IMTS pricing
and revenue sharing between carriers. Such a rule is consistent with the joint
ownership of network facilities and the sharing of investment and risk
between carriers. The rule allocates costs in a manner that is both transparent
and simple to administer (Ergas and Patterson, 1991). Further, the rule is
6 For instance, Cheong and Mullins (1991) argue that parallel accounting protects the incumbent’s
market power as new entrants are unable to exploit their (newer) technology induced cost advantage by
negotiating a lower settlement rate. Both the FCC and the UK regulatory agency OFTEL have recently
relaxed this aspect of international settlement arrangements. The FCC and OFTEL have allowed BT and
Mercury to agree to non-uniform accounting rates with US carriers for two way US–UK traffic.
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consistent with the assumption of cost symmetry between countries. The
assumption was appropriate in the early years of the ARS as international
telecommunications faced limited technology change and market liberal-
ization. These factors combined with low traffic volumes kept costs relatively
stable across countries. Given that the settlement rate for outgoing calls is an
intermediate production cost that feeds into the setting of collection rates, the
50:50 rule provided a basis for collection rate symmetry at both ends of
bilateral markets. Symmetric collection rates helped balance outgoing and in-
coming traffic, and importantly, balanced international settlement payments
between countries.
Lafont and Tirole (1995) develop a telecommunications pricing model that
provides a benchmark from which to evaluate the efficiency of the inter-
national ARS. The model assumes constant marginal costs and the absence of
entry costs and market power. Marginal cost pricing gives the first-best
collection rates:
PO = cd + cint + cf (2)
PI = cf + cint + cd (3)
where PO is the collection rate for outgoing calls from country d to country f,
and PI is the collection rate for incoming calls from f to d. Equations (2) and
(3) imply that collection rates are the same for outgoing and incoming calls.
This result is expected since transmission costs do not change with the direc-
tion in traffic, aside from billing and marketing costs.7 As shown by Alleman
and Sorce (1997), marginal cost pricing gives the first-best settlement rates:
srO = cint + cf (4)
srI = cint + cd (5)
where srO is the settlement rate paid on outgoing calls from d to f, and srI is
the settlement rate received on incoming calls from f to d. Alleman and Sorce
suggest that substantial divergences in collection rates at either end of a
bilateral market are prima-facie evidence that pricing is inefficient, and the
7 US local exchange carriers may charge different access prices for originating and terminating traffic.
In this case the cost of outgoing calls is likely to be slightly higher than the cost of incoming calls, however,
the difference is negligible when compared to the collection rate.
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division of the accounting rate into 50:50 settlement rates is only appropriate
when cd = cf.
Collection rate and cost symmetry ensure an equal distribution of
international revenue between the domestic and foreign country within the
bilateral-monopoly model. In this model, the bilateral telephone market is
characterized by natural monopoly provision of services at both ends. Should
the long-run average cost curves decline for both the domestic and foreign
carrier, even when their respective market demands are entirely satisfied, then
the unregulated carriers produce at the equilibrium collection rate–quantity
combination where marginal revenue equals marginal cost:
PO > mrO = cO (6)
PI > mrI = cI (7)
where mrO and mrI are the marginal revenue for an outgoing and incoming
call, respectively. While unregulated carriers earn supernormal profits, the
regulated carriers, governed by an average cost pricing rule, set collection
rates at a level sufficient to cover all costs of production plus a normal profit
allowance:
PO = acO > cO (8)
PI = acI > cI (9)
where acO and acI are the average cost of an outgoing and incoming call,
respectively.
Although monopoly pricing is inefficient, the ARS remained, in a sense,
‘equitable’  so  long as price–cost margins are reasonably similar across
countries. When collection rates for outgoing and incoming calls are uniform,
balanced traffic flows ensure that the domestic and foreign carriers generate
similar revenue streams from the bilateral market. Whilst monopoly carriers
accrue rents from their respective domestic customers, the rents remained
within the home country, reinforced by strict regulations preventing foreign
ownership of telecommunications carriers. Average cost pricing is equitable
when the rate of return (ROR) required for a normal profit allowance is similar
across countries. The ARS can tolerate the inefficient pricing of settlement
rates, under both monopoly and average cost pricing rules when settlement
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rate margins (above cost) are the same for incoming and outgoing calls.
Although consumer surplus is transferred from customers to carriers, there is
no international transfer of economic surplus between the domestic and
foreign carriers.
In the immediate post-war period the ARS provided a stable basis for IMTS
pricing and carrier settlements. The system encouraged investment, and
facilitated the rapid expansion of the global network and associated traffic
flows (Ergas and Patterson, 1991; Kennedy and Pastor, 1996). In particular,
this distribution of revenues financed network growth in areas of the world
that might otherwise be restricted from developing telecommunications
infrastructures. The ITU (1997) suggest the ARS is reasonably effective in
achieving its objectives provided the following criteria are satisfied for each
bilateral relationship: international services are jointly provided by monopoly
partners; collection rates are approximately equal for the same call made in
different directions; settlement rates reflect the actual costs of terminating
incoming traffic; exchange rates are relatively constant between countries;
and incoming and outgoing traffic are approximately in balance.
These conditions have become increasingly less relevant in a modern
telecommunications environment characterized by rapid innovation and asso-
ciated market deregulation. Recent technological advance in the transmission
of long-distance telephone  calls has substantially reduced the costs of
providing international service. Between 1956 and 1996 the investment cost
per minute of using transatlantic cable systems declined by over 95% (FCC,
1997a). Although cost reductions have been generally widespread, the degree
to which savings have been passed on to consumers has varied greatly over
bilateral markets. For instance, US–UK collection rates have declined by
approximately 70% from 1956 to 1996, while US–Japan collection rates have
fallen by approximately 60% for the same period (FCC, 1997a). Many
national carriers have preferred to retain the efficiency gains and so maintain
high collection rates. The additional profits generated through cost reductions
are often used to subsidize domestic telecommunications activities, develop
infrastructure, and contribute to government’s consolidated revenue (Cave,
1995).8
The reluctance of many carriers to reduce collection rates has carried over
to international access charges. Accounting rates, initially intended to reflect
the costs of terminating incoming calls, have remained high relative to
(falling) costs. For example, Ergas (1995) estimates an average mark-up of
approximately 400% between the settlement rate and the cost of handling
8 Estimates from Scanlan (1998) and TeleGeography (1998) suggest the 1996 average world-wide
collection rate-cost margin is 60%.
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traffic on Australian international routes. Similarly, the ITU (1996) surveyed
11 inbound routes into the US and found an average mark-up of approx-
imately 490%. Such high mark-ups suggest that terminating international
telephone calls can be highly profitable, allowing rents to accrue to carriers
receiving more incoming calls than it originates (Cave 1995). Under the
50:50 rule, carriers with a incoming call surplus have a strong incentive to
inefficiently price settlement rates, maintaining them significantly above the
actual cost of termination.
4. Deregulation, Asymmetric Competition and
Strategic Behaviour
By the mid-1980s several national governments began to deregulate their
telecommunications sectors. Market reforms recognized that competition
could be induced by the erosion of natural monopoly, through technological
change, and that competition is more likely to increase efficiency and service
quality, and lower collection rates. However, such national reform can
exacerbate the divergence in collection rates when competition on bilateral
telephone markets is asymmetric, e.g. when a bilateral market is characterized
by a monopoly market structure at one end and a oligopoly structure at the
other.9 Assuming outgoing and incoming calls are less than perfect sub-
stitutes, the carrier at the monopoly end faces little competitive pressure from
foreign carriers and will continue to monopoly price when unregulated. In
contrast, carriers operating at the competitive end of the market are spurred
by regulatory initiatives, rivalry and the threat of entry (Stanley, 1988). They
have a strong incentive to improve operational efficiency, lower collection
rates, and introduce more flexible services, or risk loss of market share to
existing competitors, new entrants and service providers.
The presence of call reversion and reciprocity between outgoing and
incoming traffic suggests that the carriers in a bilateral monopoly may have
to consider the strategic behaviour of one another through the term dQO/dQI,
where QO and QI are the total quantity of outgoing and incoming calls,
respectively.10 When competition is introduced into either end of the bilateral
monopoly then competitive carriers need to consider dQO/dQI, as well as make
assumptions about the strategic behaviour and market share of the other.
Suppose carrier j’s output is qOj and total industry output is
9 At 1996, 19 countries had allowed FB competition in IMTS markets (ITU, 1997).
10 Larson et al (1990) define substitution between incoming and outgoing calls as call reversion (dQO/dQI
< 0), whilst complementarity between incoming and outgoing calls is call reciprocity dQO/dQI > 0).
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(10)
Then carrier j, operating in the competitive end of the market, is concerned
with the ‘conjectural variation’ derivative dqOj/dqOk for all j ≠ k. Similarly,
dQO/dQI can be viewed as a conjectural variation across countries, based here
on assumptions of bilateral reversion and/or reciprocity. Several scenarios
describing strategic behaviour between carriers are presented below.
4.1 Loss-leading Collection Rates
Carriers may price collection rates below the settlement rate because of
competitive pressure to maintain market share and generate additional
settlement rate revenue. For instance, Johnson (1991) shows the average per
minute collection rate for US carrier calls to Brazil was US$1.17 in 1986,
while the corresponding settlement payment was US$1.25 per minute.
Although US carriers lost revenue of US$1.6 million for setting the collection
rate below the settlement rate, the lower collection rate increased outgoing
traffic which, in turn, stimulated additional incoming traffic through the
reciprocity effect. Consequently, the loss in domestic collection revenue was
more than compensated for by the US$33.6 million settlement revenue
earned for terminating incoming calls from Brazil.11
4.2 Different Profit Maximands
Collection rates in other countries are high relative to the US because differ-
ent telecommunications carriers consider vastly different profit maximands.
This has been largely brought about by the inefficient ARS (price not
matching costs), and its influence through the conjectural variations term
across countries, which adversely affects demand. Stanley (1991) suggests
that collection rate reductions in foreign countries would help alleviate the
US telephone traffic deficit by stimulating incoming US traffic. However,
administrations in other countries may be reluctant to reduce collection rates,
introduce more efficient rate structures, and liberalise market structure,
particularly if they believe the price elasticity of demand for calls is inelastic.
Here, a collection rate reduction would lead to decreased revenue from service
originating in the foreign country (and terminating in the US), and would also
cause net settlement revenue to decrease as the traffic imbalance declines.
Q q j
j
n
O O=
=
∑
1
11 Examination of 247 US outgoing telephone markets for the period 1991–1994 shows that average
collection rates were less than average settlement rates for seven markets in 1991, five in 1992, 12 in 1993,
and 11 in 1994 (FCC, various issues).
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This decline in revenue may be offset against consumer surplus gains
generated by lower collection rates. However, even when the consumer
surplus outweighs the lost service and settlement revenue, many lower income
country administrations are unwilling to sanction lower collection rates and
forego valuable foreign currency (Cheong and Mullins, 1991).
4.3 Satisficing Carrier Behaviour
Stanley (1991) argues that AT&T’s high earnings and large settlement
payments from 1985 to 1990 may have resulted in accommodating behaviour
between the joint international suppliers. Whilst AT&T realized that lower
settlement rates would increase its net revenue, when they actively refrained
from pursuing settlement rate reductions. During this period of rapid growth
in the US IMTS traffic deficit, AT&T’s overall earnings were subject to ROR
regulation. Excessive earnings could have invited regulatory review, a reduc-
tion in collection rates, or a revised lower rate of return. High settlement
rates, however, are easily passed on to consumers. A settlement rate reduction
also sends a signal to the FCC that transmission costs had declined. The
regulator would then have grounds to pursue lower collection rates and
settlement rates across all bilateral markets.
Co-operative behaviour may continue when competition is introduced into
one end of the bilateral market. While entrants are inclined to reduce
collection rates below that of incumbents to gain market share, this action has
the potential to trigger a price war and stimulate additional outgoing traffic.
When total outgoing traffic from the competitive country exceeds incoming
traffic, the monopoly country will have a favourable surplus of incoming calls.
The monopoly country will then accrue the excess returns from the margin
between the outgoing settlement rate paid by the competitive carrier to the
monopoly carrier, and the actual costs of termination on each of those surplus
minutes. Therefore, while a low price strategy serves the interests of the new
entrant and consumers at the competitive end of the market, there exists a
strategic dilemma. Should all competing carriers follow such a strategy, the
net benefit to the country may be negative. The economic rewards for
promotion of competitive behaviour are transferred to monopoly countries.
As such, governments and regulatory bodies in competitive countries may
paradoxically prefer less zealous price competition.
4.4 Collection Rate Rigidity
A competitive carrier that reduces the collection rate without a corresponding
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reduction in the settlement rate will suffer a reduction in surplus and may
incur an economic loss. Under the previously agreed settlement rate, the
domestic carrier would have to pay this rate on each additional outbound
minute of traffic generated by the price reduction. Given that the domestic
carrier’s own price elasticity of demand for outgoing calls is close to or less
than –1, and a negative or small positive value for dQO/dQI, a unilateral cut
in the collection rate would see incoming minutes rise only slightly and total
outgoing minutes rise relative to incoming minutes (Ergas, 1995). This would
be reflected in increased settlement out-payments relative to in-payments and
lower profits for the competitive carrier. In these circumstances, competitive
carriers would be reluctant to reduce collection rates unilaterally, dampening
the divergence of collection rates in asymmetrically competitive markets.
5. Alternative Calling Procedures
The anecdotal evidence above suggests FB competition can lower collection
rates, but that collection rates are still well above cost. Artificially high
accounting rates and asymmetric FB competition have created arbitrage
opportunities in many IMTS markets. Resale, call-back (CB) and refile
providers take advantage of price–cost differentials within the ARS to provide
cheaper calls. International simple resale (ISR) service providers also rely on
price–cost differentials to provide lower priced service, but bypass the ARS.
Such alternative calling procedures may provide another source of downward
pressure on collection and accounting rates.
5.2 Pure Resale
Pure resellers purchase capacity from FB carriers at wholesale rates and resell
it to smaller volume users at a price between the retail and wholesale price.
Resale was introduced into US IMTS markets in the early 1980s. New FB
entrants MCI and Sprint were authorized to resell switched services,
purchased from AT&T, while constructing facilities and negotiating operating
agreements with foreign carriers. More recently, resale has allowed service
providers, with no intention of owning or leasing international facilities, to
enter IMTS markets. Between 1991 and 1996 the number of US carriers
reporting pure resale traffic to the FCC grew from 69 to 313, whilst pure-
resale minutes increased from 495 to 7125 million minutes (or 37% of FB and
ISR minutes) (FCC, 1998).
Regulation prevents the underlying FB carrier from charging resellers a
wholesale  rate which prohibits the reseller from entering the market.
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Nevertheless, even without regulation, some degree of resale may be desirable
to the FB carrier. For instance, rapid growth in US IMTS traffic during the
early to mid-1990s to some extent reflects FB carrier’s use of resellers to
provide service to subsegments of the market. Until recently, dominant carrier
regulation, which obligated AT&T to meet all market demand at published
rates, made it unattractive for AT&T to supply market segments at lower
rates. However, by establishing a large margin between its retail and whole-
sale rate, AT&T may increase (or maintain) profits by retaining its more price-
inelastic customers, while allowing resellers to (indirectly) serve its more
price-elastic customers (Mitchell and Vogelsang, 1991). Such de facto price
discrimination is outside of Department of Justice anti-trust legislation and
FCC dominant carrier regulation. Resale traffic is also attractive because it is
bundled with the switched traffic of the underlying FB carrier, and can
indirectly increase the FB carrier’s share of outgoing traffic. Increased market
share guarantees a greater proportion of incoming traffic and settlement
revenue under the proportionate return rule.
5.2 Call-back
The growth in resale traffic is also attributed to CB. Resellers provide
customers outside the US with a US telephone number to call when they wish
to make an international call. The customer in the foreign location places a
(free) call to the US number and the reseller identifies the caller before a
connection is established. The customer is then called back by the reseller and
provided with a remote dial tone from which to place a call to the US, or
another country. Like resale, CB typically operates within the public switched
telephone network (PSTN) and ARS—the settlement out-payment is simply
reversed from the foreign country to the US. When capacity is scarce, CB
operators may lease international private lines (IPLs), exploit the difference
between outgoing and incoming collection rates, and/or carry traffic via a
third country (ITU, 1996).
The FCC (1998) argues that CB can initiate competition for traffic at the
foreign end of the market, even when foreign regulations support monopoly
supply. When setting relatively low collection rates, US CB operators compete
with foreign monopoly carriers and lower the amount of direct calls from the
foreign to the US network. Foreign monopoly carriers may be forced to
bargain down accounting rates, and/or lower collection rates, to attract CB
customers back to traditional routing methods. Foreign carrier collection rate
reductions, in addition to attracting some users away from CB, can stimulate
additional foreign billed demand which may reduce the US traffic and
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net-settlement imbalance. However, many high cost carriers are reluctant to
authorize CB, and/or prevent the reorigination of traffic through CB operators
by reducing their collection rates, as these strategies are perceived to under-
mine the incumbent carrier’s financial position (Propp, 1996; Scanlan, 1998).
Given USPs prevent price (settlement rate) competition for incoming traffic,
smaller FB carriers in competitive countries may use CB to capture a larger
share of profitable incoming calls. The increase in outgoing traffic entitles
the underlying US FB carrier to a greater share of incoming traffic, and the
accompanying settlement revenue compensates the carrier for the relatively
small margin on the facilities made available to the CB operator (OECD,
1997).
5.3 Refile
When settlement rates differentials are large across routes, carriers and service
providers have incentive to refile calls through another low-cost country.
TeleGeography (1998) estimate that 5% of world-wide traffic was refiled
through third countries in 1997. By bypassing expensive routes, refile has the
potential to reduce accounting rates. However, destination country carriers do
not consent to the re-routing of traffic, and are generally unaware of the
traffic’s origin. Many competitive country carriers are therefore reluctant to
bypass expensive routes completely and risk damaging bilateral relationships
with monopoly PTOs (OECD, 1997; Scheele and Woodall, 1997). Further,
when traffic is refiled there is no guarantee the high-cost country will agree to
lower settlement rates to remove the differential across routes. A carrier with
bargaining power may equalize rates by raising settlement rates with the
transit country.12 Finally, refile may distort prices and traffic flows when the
transit carrier provides below cost refile services so as to maximize its share of
incoming traffic and accompanying settlement rate revenue.
5.4 International Simple Resale
Recent unbundling of international telecommunications networks provides
low-cost entry opportunities for providers of ISR. By acquiring an IPL, and
connecting the line to the PSTN, ISR providers can compete in markets
previously reserved for FB carriers and resellers. Although some ISR carriers
may also be pure resellers, there are several important distinctions
12 Given the FCC’s (1997b) settlement rate Benchmarks Order, this scenario will become less likely
when the US is the transit country. The Benchmarks Order sets limits on the settlement rate payable by
US carriers to their foreign counterparts. FCC provisions are activated in the event of petitions by US
carriers.
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(TeleGeography, 1996). Since ISR carriers interconnect their IPL to the PSTN
at both ends, they are able to originate and terminate international traffic.
More importantly, an ISR carrier pays a flat monthly rate for its international
transmission capacity. By leasing IPLs, ISR carriers completely bypass the
ARS and are not obliged to pay the settlement rate to the terminating carrier
in the foreign country. Accordingly, ISR shifts the regulatory and policy focus
from international to domestic access charges, and network unbundling.
ISR carriers provide service by exploiting the difference between the retail
collection rate and the sum of the access costs for underlying network
elements (i.e. the domestic and foreign country local networks and the
international circuit). As such, the rate the ISR pays to interconnect to the
originating and terminating ends of the circuit is critical for profitability
(Cave, 1995). ISR providers generally suffer a cost disadvantage when
accessing the local PSTN as they have to pay the FB carrier the above cost
access charge (OECD, 1999). However, international transmission and
foreign termination costs are still likely to be substantially less than the
settlement rate.13 Despite an abundance of IPL capacity, ISR traffic volumes
provide a relatively small share of world-wide traffic. In 1997, approximately
1500 million minutes of ISR traffic accounted for only 2% of world-wide
IMTS traffic. Most of this traffic was carried over the US–Canada and US–UK
routes (FCC, 1998; TeleGeography, 1998). Whilst the FCC (1999) supports
ISR, entry is restricted to bilateral markets where ‘equivalent’ opportunities
exist at the foreign end, i.e. two-way ISR.14
Two-way ISR can undermine the ARS in the same manner as do
unregulated access rates between competitive carriers. Because ISR traffic is
not subject to ARS arrangements, competition from ISR providers can force
FB carriers to reduce collection and settlement rates to prevent network
bypass, and the loss of settlement revenue. FCC (various issues) data suggest
that ISR entry could generate substantial price reductions. The average US
→ UK collection (settlement) rate has fallen by 46 (65)% since ISR was first
proposed for this market in 1992. During the period, average collection
(settlement) rates for total US IMTS traffic declined by 33 (41)%. The price
decline between 1992 and 1994 is particularly surprising given that ISR was
not officially authorized until 1994. More recently, US → New Zealand and
13 At 1997 network access costs for an ISR carrier providing service from the US to Australia were
US$0.11. The corresponding collection rate, offered through MCI’s ‘One International Calling Plan’ is
US$0.47 (TeleGeography, 1998).
14 FCC approved countries are: Canada, UK (1994); Sweden, New Zealand (1996); Australia (1997);
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, France, Germany, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, Japan,
Italy, Ireland, Hong Kong and Spain (1998). Australia, New Zealand, Sweden and UK authorities permit
ISR carriers to provide service on any bilateral market (ITU 1996).
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US → Sweden collection rates declined by 50% and 29%, respectively,
following the authorization of two-way ISR in 1996. Such anecdotal evidence
suggests that potential entry by ISR carriers may be enough to force prices
down.
6. Conclusions
International telecommunications has been extensively regulated since the
latter half of the 19th century. Most countries have prevented several FB
carriers from providing IMTS, and placed restrictions on both private and
foreign ownership. The ARS has also constrained the development of IMTS
markets, and their pricing, generally. Market entry is restricted as only
designated carriers are allowed to establish operating agreements for the
exchange of traffic at the agreed accounting rate. Recent telecommunications
liberalization has recognized that competition and private ownership can
improve efficiency and service quality, and lower prices. However, relatively
high accounting rates and asymmetric competition have prevented the setting
of price to the cost of service provision in many bilateral markets. Further,
USPs prevent new entrants from exploiting their technology advantage by
negotiating lower settlement rates to compete for incoming traffic. Recent
estimates suggest collection rates and settlement rates are set as high as 60%
and 500% above cost, respectively.
The FCC (1996) and WTO (1997) have called for the opening of mar-
kets to private and foreign investors, increased competition in infrastructure
service provision, direct access to foreign networks, and the development of
alternative calling arrangements for carrying IMTS. The ability of alternative
arrangements, such as resale and CB, to instigate price reductions is limited
as they operate within the PSTN and ARS framework. The provision of
capacity to pure resellers and CB operators provides an opportunity for an
FB carrier to obtain highly profitable incoming minutes from a competing FB
carrier. CB minutes can also substantially add to a low-cost country’s traffic
imbalance. In particular, when low collection rates stimulate outgoing traffic,
and return traffic declines as more incoming traffic is substituted into CB.
When settlement rates exceed the cost of termination, the reoriginated CB
traffic increases the high-cost carrier’s profits. Naturally, these carriers will be
reluctant to bargain for lower settlement rates. By contrast, ISR traffic
completely bypasses traditional settlement arrangements, and can undermine
the ARS in a similar manner to unregulated settlement rate negotiation
between competitive carriers. US price data suggests that US–UK collection
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and settlement rates have fallen by 46% and 65%, respectively, since ISR was
proposed in 1992.
Finally, the WTO (1997) agreement authorized carriers to negotiate more
commercially orientated agreements for access to foreign networks and inter-
national circuits. The Australian IMTS provider Telstra recently announced
that commercial deals, which include accounting rates (a one-way price which
is agreed by both parties) or termination rates (a one-way price set by
destination), cover over half of their IMTS business (Telstra, 1999). As ISR,
commercial arrangements and new technology (such as the internet) become
more widespread, settlement rates and the ARS will become less important
to many carriers and developed countries. Developing countries that use
settlement revenue to upgrade domestic networks and improve universal
service will be disadvantaged by the move to cost based settlement rates or
the elimination of the ARS. Here, FCC (1996) and WTO initiatives should
be accompanied by World Bank programmes that directly target network
development and access.
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